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Abstract
While the semi-presidential French regime and the reinforcement of 
‘presidentializa-tion’ under Nicolas Sarkozy have often been associated with the 
idea of disruptive and heroic changes, France’s post-crisis budgetary policy 
appeared strongly embedded in the previous commitments made by President 
Sarkozy and relied largely on measures of a gradual and low-profile nature 
without significant U-turns. In order to explain this result, the article 
emphasizes the effects of French institutions on government capabilities and 
on the potential allocation of blame and the related political strategies connected 
with the electoral cycle and timing. In addition, it also explores the specific 
characteristics of the French national crisis and its perceptions by top 
bureaucrats, as well as the nature of the external macro-constraints that 
influenced French budgetary policy, whether originating with markets, 
international organizations or the European Union.
Points for practitioners
This article emphasizes the importance of institutions and political strategies in 
cutback management. The main argument is that budget reduction policies are 
embedded in pol-itical and electoral constraints that strongly affect their design 
and choices. The article provides many empirical elements about the specific 
characteristics of the French national crisis and how French governments reacted 
to the 2008 crisis. It puts emphasis on the specificities of French political 
institutions and the strong exposure to blame. The French political strategies of 
blame avoidance are described between 2008 and 2012, as well as the nature 
of the external macro-constraints that influenced French
budgetary policy, whether originating with markets, international organizations or 
the European Union.
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Introduction
Over the last decades, democracies have found themselves in a dilemma. On the
spending side, past commitments take up an ever-growing proportion of bud-
gets, generating strong inheritance or legacy eﬀects (Pierson, 2001). This freezing
of historical patterns of government spending leads to ‘ﬁscal sclerosis’, combined
with a decline in ﬁscal democracy characterized by two phenomena (Streeck and
Mertens, 2013: 27): the level of mandatory spending increases to the detriment
of discretionary spending; and ‘state activities are increasingly less responsive to
changing interests among the citizenry’ (Streeck and Mertens, 2013: 27).
Moreover, growing ﬁscal competition between countries results in a freezing
of revenues, and the constant rise in debt that ensues impacts negatively on
the legitimacy of governments. The 2008 ﬁnancial crisis took place within this
context and exacerbated the problems because it required governments to ﬁnd
leeway to stimulate their economies, while, at the same time, further reducing
revenues, thereby making more cuts necessary at the risk of triggering a reces-
sionary spiral.
From this perspective, a detailed study of the French response to the 2008 crisis
is interesting, for two reasons. The ﬁrst is that the French budget is speciﬁcally
rigidiﬁed. The crisis occurred against a background of 40 years of deterioration in
the public ﬁnances, with several factors explaining the increasing rigidity of the
budget: civil service salaries; operational expenses and welfare spending; and
the increasing proportion of the budget allocated to debt servicing. This has led
to a ‘great petriﬁcation’ (Baumgartner et al., 2009; Sine´, 2006). National debt grew
eighteenfold between 1978 and 2007, while it rose as a proportion of gross domestic
product (GDP) from 21.1% in 1978 to 40% in 1992, reaching 64% in December
2007 (Champsaur and Cotis, 2010). In addition, since the early 2000s, tougher ﬁscal
competition prompted governments to reduce tax rates, reductions assessed at
4.3% of GDP between 2000 and mid-2012 (Cac, 2014). All this hints at the power-
ful vested interests behind public spending in France, which have managed to
obtain beneﬁts from tax policies (speciﬁcally from tax loopholes), while other
groups ﬁnd themselves dealing with a state that is increasingly less responsive
to their interests. This growing diﬃculty in meeting new demands has made it
increasingly hard for politicians to satisfy their electoral clienteles: since 1978,
France has experienced a continuous cycle of political swings at each general elec-
tion, with only one exception in 2007 (when Sarkozy managed to mark himself out
from his predecessor, despite being of the same party, by campaigning on the theme
of a clean break).
The second reason why the French case makes an interesting study is that the
semi-presidential regime established under the Fifth Republic is generally seen as
one with a strong executive. Leaders are seen to have extensive decision-making
capacity, arising from the exceptional legitimacy conferred by the election of the
president by direct universal suﬀrage and from instruments of rationalized
parliamentarianism that supposedly allow him to impose his will on Parliament.
Nicolas Sarkozy’s victory stood out in two ways: it was incontestable and gave the
president a very strong mandate to govern (he was elected by a wide majority of
53% of votes, with very high voter turnout (83.97%)); and it was accompanied by
radical reforming rhetoric and a liberal platform.
These two elements result in a paradox. While the French regime and the
reinforcement of ‘presidentialization’ under Sarkozy have been associated with
the idea of disruptive and ‘heroic’ changes, France’s post-crisis budgetary policy
appeared strongly embedded in the frozen historical patterns of government
spending, but also in the initial commitments made by Sarkozy vis-a-vis his clien-
teles immediately following his election in 2007. The purpose of this article is to
explain why French responses to the ﬁnancial crisis have not opened a window of
opportunity for setting fundamentally new priorities and sustainable long-term
solutions that would alter existing policies and change the distribution of beneﬁts
between interest groups. In explaining the formulation of France’s post-2008 policy
of retrenchment, we will draw on theories that analyse the politics of retrenchment
in welfare states (Pierson, 1994) and ﬁscal consolidation by showing how institu-
tions, blame-avoidance factors (Hood, 2002; Weaver, 1986) and the electoral cycle
and timing play an important role in framing the rationales of political leaders.
These political rationales will be balanced by the national characteristics of the
crisis and the way in which it is perceived by politicians and senior bureaucrats, as
well as by the nature of the external macro-constraints that inﬂuenced French
budgetary policy, whether originating with markets, international organizations
or the European Union (EU) (Kickert, 2012).
We will ﬁrst develop our theoretical framework by describing the characteristics
of France’s institutions and their inﬂuence on blame-avoidance strategies. We will
then provide a detailed characterization of the 2008 ﬁscal crisis in France and the
resulting ﬁscal policy by dividing the years 2007–2012 into four periods. In the last
section, we will address the interwoven factors (economic, political, external) that
may explain the governance of France’s ﬁscal crisis, with a particular focus on the
importance of the political dimension.
Our exploration of France’s politics of retrenchment over the years 2007–2012
draws on several sources. We began by building a comprehensive chronology of the
many ﬁscal and taxation measures adopted by the Fillon government from 2007 to
2012. From public documents produced during the process and from press releases,
we systematically analysed these measures in the light of our theoretical frame-
work. We also conducted several in-depth taped interviews with individuals from
the various executive and ministerial organizations engaged in these policies
(presidency, prime minister, Budget Directorate, Treasury Directorate, State
Modernizing Unit).
Our theoretical argument: Blame avoidance, interest groups
and retrenchment
How did the French government react to the 2008 crisis and how were both the
recovery programme and the politics of retrenchment constructed following the
crisis? Our argument is that ﬁscal responses were shaped not so much by the quest
for a ‘viable’ and ‘correct’ economic and budgetary diagnosis of the crisis, or by the
aim of adopting drastic remedies, but, above all, by political strategies
geared towards electoral constraints, interest groups and constituencies, and
blame-avoidance objectives. We suggest that France’s institutions are particularly
conducive to such outcomes.
France’s semi-presidential regime, the management of the public finances
and blame avoidance: A two-edged sword
France’s Fifth Republic, often referred to as a semi-presidential regime (Duverger,
1980; Elgie, 1999), has traditionally been seen as characterized by a set of institu-
tions that provide strong decision-making capacities. Although the Constitution of
4 October 1958 established a parliamentary system, both institutional practice and
constitutional reforms have increasingly reinforced the president’s pre-eminence
over the prime minister, with the president being elected by popular vote and the
Chambers enjoying only limited legislative powers (Brouard et al., 2009; Elgie,
2013). The constitutional reform of 2000 reinforced the presidentialization of the
regime by bringing the presidential and parliamentary terms into alignment and
thus reducing the probability of a government split (‘cohabitation’) between a
president and prime minister from opposite parties. Nicolas Sarkozy accentuated
this ‘presidentialization’, which earned him the sobriquet of ‘hyper-president’. He
was a clear election winner, standing on the platform of a break with the welfare
state model of the past and a commitment to more liberal and business-friendly
policies, along with tax cuts.
As widely acknowledged in the comparative literature on budget policies
(Schick, 1991; Wildavsky, 1975), formal institutions do play a role in the formu-
lation of retrenchment policies. In the French case, a dominant view has been that
it is easy to legislate for reform and to act on ﬁscal matters under France’s
Fifth Republic system because of the power it grants to the executive. As a
result, ministers in the Finance and Budget Ministries, as well as top bureaucrats
in the Treasury and Budget Division, have played a central role in the core execu-
tive through their command of ﬁnancial coordination (Hayward and Wright, 2002:
164–187). Moreover, France’s semi-presidential regime has often been associated
with the concentration of power, strong administrative capacities – with top
bureaucrats protecting the ‘general interest’ – and ‘heroic politics’ (Franc¸ois, 1998).
We suggest that this view is misleading, at least for the policies of retrenchment
aﬀecting the many constituencies and interest groups attached to welfare state, and
economic and business policies. As advanced by Pierson (1994: 70), ‘the theoretical
case for expecting centralized systems to be more successful is suspect’ since ‘the
greater centralization of political institutions is a two-edged sword: centralized
government concentrates power but it concentrates accountability . . . the greater
institutional control must be weighed against the greater likelihood that it would be
blamed for unwanted reforms’. The reduction of the presidential term to ﬁve
years has further increased the president’s exposure to blame. As the literature
on welfare state retrenchment suggests (Starke, 2006), when determining ‘govern-
mental capacity for loss imposition’ (Pal and Weaver, 2003: 294), the ‘concentra-
tion of power eﬀects’ must be empirically weighed against the ‘concentration of
accountability eﬀect’. The more institutional or partisan control over government
policy becomes uniﬁed, the easier it gets for individuals to make judgements of
political responsibility. Political institutions with a high concentration of power
will also concentrate blame, while fragmented systems will have greater potential to
‘share’ or ‘shift the blame’ but also to build coalitions. In the French context, the
likelihood of the president being blamed is high for two primary reasons.
First, the fact that the president is directly elected makes him/her an electorally
powerful ﬁgure for the majority since ‘members of the legislature will not cross the
president because the president is the most valuable vote getter that political parties
possess’ (Huber, 1996: 30). This mechanism has been further reinforced with the
constitutional reform of 2000 and the primacy of the presidential elections, which
strengthen the perception that the president is the person really in charge.
Second, while power largely proceeds from the president and his/her election,
the president is not accountable to Parliament whereas, by contrast, the govern-
ment is accountable both to Parliament and to the president. This means that the
government and prime minister are primarily subordinate to the president, and
may be used as potential scapegoats (Grossman, 2009: 44).
This concentration of political power increases political accountability and
implies a high risk of political loss in implementing a policy of retrenchment
(Hood, 2002; Pierson, 1994; Weaver, 1986). In the absence of mechanisms of
collective responsibility (like those found in parliamentary regimes and in coalition
governments), the political cost of large-scale reforms is particularly high: minority
parties that have no share in power are encouraged to take up populist opposition
strategies designed to win them the next elections, in a constant seesaw process.
Opposing the reforms introduced by the government in place is a passport to power
at the next election, though at the risk of sparking rapid disenchantment. In add-
ition, it prompts politicians to be particularly watchful of their electoral support, to
favour incremental reforms (Pisani-Ferry, 2014), to pay particular attention to
interest groups potentially aﬀected by cutbacks and to protect their political con-
stituencies from policies of retrenchment. With this perspective in mind, we explore
the idea that retrenchment policies depend largely on their ‘political viability’
(Hall, 1989: 374–375), that is, the political and electoral implications of economic
or budgetary solutions and cutbacks. The consequence of the strength of the pol-
itical executive in France is therefore more to allow the president to make choices
based on political considerations than to impose drastic reforms.
Perceptions and anticipations of the nature of the crisis and of ‘external’
constraints
Two further points need to be made in characterizing the political and administra-
tive reasoning at work. The choice of solutions for resolving the crisis and the
anticipation of the associated risks of credit and blame depend, on the one hand,
on the perception of the nature and intensity of the economic crisis and, on the
other hand, on the perception of the constraints weighing on the state in question.
These dimensions give a large role to key senior civil servants serving in the Budget
Directorate, in the Treasury Department and in the president’s and prime
minister’s cabinets. Of course, their interpretations and solutions may be ﬁltered
and selected by politicians and will depend on the institutional relationship between
politicians and bureaucrats.
As suggested by many authors (Blyth, 2002: 10; Hall, 1989), the interests at stake
in a crisis and the interpretations of that crisis are far from unambiguous. Several
scholars emphasize the role played by ideational legacies or economic traditions,
such as ‘statist liberalism’ (Vail, 2014) or, for the French case, ‘post-dirigisme’
(Clift, 2012b), in the framing of economic and budgetary responses to crises.
Our approach is slightly diﬀerent because the mechanisms through which these
intellectual frameworks operate often remain insuﬃciently precise: these supposed
legacies correspond to national stereotypes (the strength of Keynesianism in
France) of questionable validity, and are contradicted by other studies that empha-
size the presence of a neoliberal trend in French aﬀairs. Following Starke’s (2006:
113) suggestions, we prefer not to presuppose the existence of frameworks but to
show how budgetary choices were politically, administratively and economically
constructed and how the actors involved understood the crisis and its various
dimensions. We thus focus on bounded rationalities and the way in which they
have been constructed (Cox, 2001), a mix of economic diagnoses, budgetary con-
straints and political strategies.
The second important constraint aﬀecting government decisions is the percep-
tions of the constraints – wrongly called ‘external’ – that characterize the inter-
dependencies within which Eurozone economies and states are required to operate,
as well as the expectation of potential leeway in tackling these constraints. In the
case of the 2008 crisis, the constraints are obviously linked with the new European
treaties (Clift and Ryner, 2014: 141–143). Beyond the very high exposure of French
banks to risks from the Southern European countries, which constitute a further
incentive for France to argue for a strengthening of solidarity mechanisms, it is the
integration of the European economies that leads to the perception of the situation
as one of ‘systemic risk’, which makes it acceptable for French leaders to surrender
sovereignty to a degree that they would consider inconceivable in other circum-
stances. Leaders’ perceptions of the attitude of the ﬁnancial markets are also crucial
because – at certain moments – the solutions they choose constitute, above all,
signals for the markets. This concern for market credibility has been central and
encompasses issues like the perception of France’s reputation and the conﬁdence of
ﬁnancial markets, trends in borrowing costs, or the maintenance of the country’s
AAA credit rating by the bond-rating agencies (Clift, 2013).
Tensions and contradictions in France’s fiscal consolidation
policy: When budget constraints meet politics
When examining how the French government responded to the ﬁscal crisis, it is
important to consider a longer period, beginning in May 2007. Budgetary policy
and cutbacks are constrained by factors inherited from previous political commit-
ments and ﬁscal and tax policies (Schick, 1991). Since all decisions took place
during Sarkozy’s presidential term, the ‘politics of cutback budgeting’ were severely
constrained by the electoral agenda. Emphasizing the strength of blame-avoidance
factors, but also the bounded structure of decisions on budgetary and economic
choices by French senior oﬃcials, we have divided the process into four sequences:
the initial decisions of 2007; the 2008 crisis; and two successive responses between
late 2008 and 2010.
Before the crisis: An ambivalent balance between spending cuts and tax cuts
(May 2007–September 2008)
In France, the crisis occurred more than a year after the new presidency had
launched its new policies. Hence, the idea of spending reviews and cutbacks was
not a reaction to the 2008 crisis, but was formulated in the mid-2000s, introduced in
Nicolas Sarkozy’s 2007 electoral platform and implemented soon after his election.
The initial choices were based on the beliefs, founded on the Camdessus (2004) and
Pe´bereau (2005) reports and supported by the president’s entourage, that the dir-
ection of France’s public spending was not sustainable. The 2008 crisis occurred
more than a year after the initial decisions. Several of the devices employed after the
2008 and 2010 crises were conceived before then and were reinforced rather than
undermined by those events. However, austerity was far from the sole factor in the
formulation of the government’s budget and economic policy from 2007. Large tax
cuts were oﬀered to reward the winning candidate’s backers (the rich) and to sup-
port interest groups. The initial policy mix was, then, ambiguous and paradoxical.
On the one hand, in July 2007, the president and his team had launched a
General Public Policy Review (RGPP). During his campaign, Sarkozy had advo-
cated a global ﬁnancial plan dominated by cuts in public expenditure, while pro-
mising a reduction in the tax burden. Ministries were thus asked to schedule
spending reductions but also to reshape their own roles and to consider alternative
strategies for delivering their public policies (Bezes, 2010). Organizational decisions
focused predominantly on: abolishing departments; eradicating overlaps; increas-
ing government eﬃciency through eliminations, simpliﬁcations, mergers, lean man-
agement, synergies, automation, better management and better command and
control intended to generate budget savings; achieve cutbacks; and enhance prod-
uctivity and eﬃciency.
The Fillon government had also strengthened budgetary dominance by creating
an enlarged Ministry for Budgeting, Public Accounts and the Civil Service to
enforce a systematic control of central and local governments, as well as on
social security. The RGPP included initiatives to restrict state expenditure. First,
the 2008 Budget Bill capped state spending increases to no more than projected
inﬂation (‘zero volume’) for the entire mandate through to 2012. A second import-
ant measure was a restructuring process to reduce the number of civil servants,
achieved by the non-replacement of one in two retiring state employees. The 2008
Finance Bill set a target of eliminating the equivalent of 22,800 full-time civil ser-
vice posts (see Figure 1).1 In order to push through this policy of non-replacement,
the Fillon government undertook to allocate 50% of the resulting savings to the
remaining staﬀ in the form of ‘wage compensation’ intended to oﬀset the negative
eﬀects of the reforms. According to the Budget Directorate, the total amount
ﬁnally saved through the RGPP between 2007 and 2012 was E11.9 billion (IGA
et al., 2012), of which E3.6 billion came from the reduction in personnel costs.
During this pre-crisis period, one ﬁnal initiative came onto the agenda: a multi-
annual public ﬁnance policy underpinned by a multiannual budget based on the
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Figure 1. Public staff reduction in France in the 2000s.
Source: Direction ge´ne´rale du Tre´sor (2010).
RGPP. Inspired by the Budget Directorate, the multiannual public ﬁnance policy
received constitutional ratiﬁcation through the revision passed by Parliament on 21
July 2008. The ﬁrst multiannual budget set the ﬁnancial course for all civil service
departments (central government, social security and local authorities) for the
period 2009–2012, along with the principles of governance required to steer this
course.
On the other hand, measures taken in July 2007 also reveal a political payback
agenda running counter to the objective of restoring the sustainability of the public
ﬁnances. The cost of the French ﬁscal package of 2007, called the loi TEPA, was
assessed in 2008 at E9 billion. First, the loi TEPA included an exemption from
income tax and payroll taxes on overtime. Second, it contained a number of meas-
ures that beneﬁted the right-wing electorate. ‘Inheritance tax’ was eliminated for
95% of direct inheritance, and donations to children and grandchildren were
encouraged by tax exemptions. In addition, total income tax and local property
taxes assessed on the main residence, as well as wealth taxes and corporate sur-
taxes, had already been limited by the application of the ‘bouclier ﬁscal’, or tax
shield, which limited the maximum amount of tax payable on income to 50%.
Moreover, up to E50,000 invested in equity for small and medium enterprises
was made deductible from the so-called solidarity wealth tax (ISF). Tax relief on
the main residence in the calculation of ISF was increased to 30%. These election-
driven decisions drew criticism from top bureaucrats in the Budget Ministry and
Treasury Department, who saw that they would contribute signiﬁcantly to deﬁcit
and debt levels in circumstances where a number of worrying signals from the US
were already pointing to a deterioration in economic conditions. Indeed, the
macroeconomic background provided in the 2008 ﬁnance White Paper, presented
by the Treasury Department on 26 September 2007, drew immediate attention to
four major risks in the US: the sharp fall in residential investment in the US; the
sudden increase in mortgage defaults; the rise in stock market volatility; and the
abrupt drop in global demand and trade. The negative impact of these risks on
France’s situation was mentioned: escalating tensions in the credit markets, aﬀect-
ing global economic activity; tighter ﬁnancing conditions; the collapse of asset
values; and a fall in investment and consumption. France would face a 0.5%
drop in growth in 2008.
Even before the crisis, therefore, Sarkozy’s policy seems somewhat unbalanced
and likely to exacerbate the debt, since the cost of the tax cuts introduced by the
loi TEPA was far from covered by the spending decisions taken under the
RGPP review.
Enter the 2008 crisis in France: A parenthesis of stimulus
The ﬁnancial crisis began 15 months after Nicolas Sarkozy’s election. From 2008,
the total government deﬁcit increased rapidly, reaching 7.5% of GDP in 2009. The
crisis ended the country’s ability to contain the rise in public debt, which had
stabilized over the period 2004–2007 (at 64% of GDP), a stability at least partially
attributable to creative accounting. Public debt rose by 22 percentage points over
the period in question (2007–2011), that is, ﬁve times faster than over the previous
15 years (Champsaur and Cotis, 2010; see also Table 1).
The crisis of 2008 caught the executive on the back foot. It embarked on a policy
of budgetary expansion to absorb the shock caused by the collapse of Lehman
Brothers. This ushered in an ambiguous and very short-lived period of stimulus,
culminating in the international G20 summit in London in April 2009. Here, our
enquiry leads us to challenge the interpretation that the French response to the
crisis reﬂected the existence of state traditions of economic policy (the ‘statist lib-
eral tradition’ (Vail, 2014) or ‘post-dirigisme’ (Clift, 2012b)) and the strength of
Keynesian ideas at the Ministry of Economics and Finance (Vail, 2014: 71).
Instead, our investigation identiﬁes a dividing line, within the executive itself,
between partisans and adversaries of Keynesian stimulus policy, which resulted
in the defeat of the former. While the president’s special adviser, Henri Guaino,
advocated the need for a massive (E100 billion) stimulus plan, the main players
then involved in economic and budgetary decision-making – whether the Elyse´e’s
deputy secretary-general responsible for economic policy, the head of the Treasury,
the Budget director or diﬀerent advisers to the president, prime minister and min-
ister of economics and ﬁnance on economic and budgetary matters – shared
uniform orthodox liberal views. With a background in the Treasury and Budget
departments, and, in some cases, a spell in the ﬁnancial sector, they were highly
critical of France’s last Keynesian stimulus plan, dating from the early 1980s, at a
time when the country’s economic competitiveness had been in decline since the
early 2000s.
The onset of the 2008 crisis did not greatly alter their view of the handicaps
aﬀecting the French economy (a continuously declining trade balance2 and
deterioration in the public ﬁnances).3 These senior oﬃcials were critical of the
deliberately optimistic bias traditionally apparent in France’s growth forecasts,
and of the interference of political considerations in the construction of growth
projections, resulting in systematic disparities between budget forecasts and
Table 1. Main budgetary and economic figures for France
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
GDP per capita (E) 28,400 29,600 30,100 29,200 29,900 30,600
Real GDP growth rate (%) 2.5 2.3 –0.1 –3.1 1.7 1.7
General government
deficit/surplus (% of GDP)
–2.3 –2.7 –3.3 –7.5 –7.1 –5.2
General government
gross debt (% of GDP)
63.7 64.2 68.2 79.2 82.3 85.8
Inflation (HICP) 1.9 1.6 3.2 0.1 1.7 2.3
Unemployment rate (ILO) 9.2 8.4 7.8 9.5 9.7 9.6
Source: Eurostat.
outcomes. They were (privately) critical of politicians, whom they saw as too con-
cerned to avoid the blame inherent in consolidation policies. They were largely in
favour of sharp cuts in expenditure on civil service personnel and on transfers, and
very mistrustful of a Keynesian doctrine seen as a constant game of catch-up,
dictated by electoral strategies of ‘credit claiming’. These individuals tried to con-
tain the temptation of a Keynesian response on the assumption that there could be
no consumption-based national solution in a country that had accumulated a
record balance-of-trade deﬁcit, which would be further exacerbated by a policy
of reﬂation. A compromise between the need for stimulus and continued austerity
led to the adoption of a policy of ‘Ri-lance’, to employ a term coined by Minister of
Economics and Finance Christine Lagarde, a combination of two words –‘rigueur’
(rigor) and ‘relance’ (stimulus) – referred to the ‘subtle’ mix of cutback measures
and stimulus policies.4
The new balance of power in response to the crisis: Framing the recovery
plan, course adjustments and sending signals to markets (September 2008–
February 2010)
In response to the shock caused by the Lehman Brothers collapse and the interbank
crisis, France’s leaders drew up a recovery plan that was essentially national.
However, it was repackaged as an element of a European recovery plan presented
at the G20 summit in London on 2 April 2009.
A recovery plan targeted more at investment than consumption: A patriotic strategy in support
of an uncompetitive economy. The recovery plan adopted by the French government
sought, ﬁrst, to respond to the need not to further undermine a domestic economic
and budgetary situation seen as deeply compromised. By setting the level of the
national contribution at E26 billion, the government chose to position itself at
precisely 1.3% of GDP, the midpoint of the range set for Europe by the heads
of state and government. If we take out the cash-ﬂow measures, which were not
included in the data for other countries, the French plan represented only some
1.1% of GDP, placing it second from bottom of the major developed nations.
However, it diﬀered from many recovery plans that sought to stimulate con-
sumption. Indeed, as one of the players involved in the process explained: ‘regard-
ing the stimulus, we pretended to be scraping 1.2% of GDP, and then we made a
cash advance, in other words we brought forward investments that were already
scheduled’. The French approach was characterized by the scale of the eﬀort made
to boost corporate cash ﬂows and public and private investment. Out of a total
initial estimated amount of E26 billion: E11.6 billion were allocated to measures to
improve company cash ﬂows, notably, through tax measures in the budget; E10.5
billion were allocated to public investment, divided between the state (E4 billion),
public companies (E4 billion) and local authorities (E2.5 billion), though this was
not, strictly speaking, new or additional investment, merely a bringing forward of
public investment measures already scheduled for the subsequent years; and E2
billion were allocated to two sectors particularly exposed to the eﬀects of the eco-
nomic crisis – housing (support for local employment) and the car industry (with
targeted measures in favour of low-powered vehicles, a market dominated by
French manufacturers). The cost of these exceptional investment measures was
oﬀset by the use of a national loan combined with a concomitant reduction in
operating expenses. These choices ﬁt with an interpretation in terms of liberal
patriotism (Clift, 2012a) insofar as they reﬂect a desire to support key sectors of
the French economy exposed to little or no international competition. Conversely,
they demonstrate that – by contrast with the claim made by Vail (2014) – there was
no wish to implement a Keynesian policy of stimulus through consumption.
The challenge for the executive was to ﬁnd a way to reconcile this temporary
stimulus with the continuing goal of reducing structural spending, as contained in
the 2009–2011 multiannual programmes. The Budget Ministry’s objective was to
ensure that the exceptional investment drive did not deﬂect ministries from their
targets for reducing growth in their operating expenses, and to prevent the counter-
cyclical measures adopted from undermining the credibility of the strategy to bring
about sounder public ﬁnances and the new cognitive frame that the Budget
Ministry was seeking to impose. A special budget was created to fund this plan:
it would ring-fence the exceptional allocations from ordinary government spend-
ing, which should then be traceable throughout the whole implementation chain.
The aim was to avoid these allocations continuing beyond the term of the recovery
plan. An ad hoc cross-cutting ‘Economic Recovery Plan’ was created by the
Corrective Finance Bill of 4 February 2009, slated to ﬁnish at the end of ﬁnancial
year 2010. Far as it was from Keynesian standards, the short-lived ‘Ri-lance’ par-
enthesis closed quickly anyway with the onset of the sovereign debt crisis.
Consolidation measures taken in response to the crisis. By contrast, a ﬁrst package of
measures to reduce the rate of growth in public spending was introduced with the
passing of the ﬁrst Public Finance Planning Act in February 2009 (for the Period
2009–2012). To slow the growth of public spending, a zero-volume rule (excluding
the recovery plan) for 2009, 2010 and 2011 was set for state expenditure, with the
aim of extending it to the whole public sphere. The annual rate of increase in
spending by the state, state operators and primary social security bodies was
restricted to 1.1%. The maximum rate of increase in health care and social security
expenses was set at 3.3%. With regard to local authorities, the government was
constitutionally precluded from applying a spending cap. Faced with this consti-
tutional obstacle, it applied a zero-volume rule to central government allocations to
local authorities (which did not prevent them from oﬀsetting the fall in state sup-
port by increasing local taxes).
Sending signals to markets: Making working people pay for the recovery while sparing
pensioners. In addition, in circumstances marked by an anticipated increase in the
public deﬁcit and a growing risk of interest rate rises, the government chose to send
a signal to the markets in order to give credibility to the president’s undertaking to
move expenditure trends in the right direction by announcing the decision to
reform the pensions system, with the stated aim of balancing the pension books
by 2018.
The equilibrium on which the pension reform was based was very comparable
with that underpinning the recovery plan, with the principle of balancing counter-
cyclical investment by planned cuts in operating expenses. The pension reform was
forecast to generate a gain of E16 billion in 2016 and to prevent a E49 billion rise in
debt between 2012 and 2016. Nevertheless, it was seen by many observers as a
convenient short-run strategy to buy time. The strategic character of this reform
was particularly transparent in view of the government’s decision that the pension
reserve fund, which was supposed to be used only after 2020, would be gradually
depleted from 2011 in order to cushion the deﬁcit in the system over the period of
implementation, and because the whole plan was based on deliberately optimistic
forecasts by the Conseil d’orientation des retraites (COR). The Cour des Comptes
(2013) exposed the incapacity of the reform to meet the pension system’s funding
challenges in the context of an ageing population. Despite the high level of French
pensions on international comparisons (OECD, 2013),5 the pension reform repre-
sented a trade-oﬀ to the advantage of ageing and retired people (who voted mas-
sively for Sarkozy), and to the detriment of young people and people in employment.
A systematic but low-profile policy of retrenchment under electoral
constraints (March 2010–May 2012)
This ﬁnal period was characterized by an intensiﬁcation in the tensions, not to say
the contradictions, between deteriorating economic conditions that seemed to call
for the adoption of drastic measures, and the move into the end phase of the
electoral cycle (in 2012), which conversely oﬀered an incentive to defer their adop-
tion to a post-election time frame. Four types of measures and strategies were
adopted over this period.
Holding down spending by applying a zero-value standard. The ﬁrst measure was to adopt
a new Corrective Finance Bill for the period 2011–2014 and to introduce a new rule
into the 2011 Budget Bill to stabilize all public expenditure at ‘zero value’, exclud-
ing interest on debt and pension spending over the period 2011–2013. This so-called
‘zero-value rule’ was a way to achieve the ‘zero real-terms expenditure’
(‘zero volume’) target for the entire national budget. It enabled the government
to counter the inevitable upward trend in these costs for that period, which would,
in fact, have absorbed virtually all the slack that would have emerged if total public
spending grew in line with the expected rate of inﬂation (+1.5% in 2011;+1.75%
in 2012/2013). Allowing for the steady growth in the cost of debt and pensions, the
application of this strict principle meant reducing the state’s operating expenditure
by 10% in three years, with a reduction of 5% in 2011, a target to be achieved
essentially through the savings generated by the RGPP. One signiﬁcant measure
aﬀecting the civil service wage bill was a freeze on the point value of civil service
pay from 2010. The resulting net fall in the purchasing power of public servants
(relative to inﬂation) came on top of the rise in their pension contributions dis-
cussed earlier, and had the eﬀect of making measures aﬀecting civil servants the
primary variable used in adjusting the budget. All these actions reduced the annual
rate of growth in the volume of public spending by an average of 0.8% over the
period 2011–2013. Nonetheless, this overall target varied in its application between
the diﬀerent components of the public sector.
Sharing the burden: Extending restraint to all public bodies. With the adoption of the
three-year budget for 2011–2013, spending cuts were extended to other public
bodies, such as agencies, where costs had continued to grow rapidly. To this
end, the government organized two ‘national deﬁcit conferences’ on 28 January
and 20 May 2010, bringing together everyone involved in public spending.
A prime ministerial circular on 26 March 2010 also introduced strategic
‘guidance’ for all ‘state operators’, for example, all public organizations at arm’s
length from central administrations, including agencies, e´tablissements publics, uni-
versities and so on. This strategic guidance process extended the Loi Organique
relative aux Lois de Finances (LOLF) framework and entailed the introduction of
clear targets through performance contracts for each agency. The reform also
imposed a 10% reduction in operating costs over a three-year period (2011–
2013) and a reduction in personnel costs of 1.5% per year.
As regards social security, the application of the spending rule to health-care
expenditure (Objectif National de De´penses d’Assurance Maladie, ONDAM) was
intensiﬁed. The limit on national health-care spending, deﬁned in terms of nominal
growth rates, was reduced from 3.3% in 2010 to 2.8% for the years 2011 to 2014.6
Two types of targeted savings measures were introduced to slow the rate of
growth in local authority spending. The ﬁrst was the application of a zero-value
rule to ﬁnancial transfers from central government to local authorities for 2011–
2013. The option of a sharp cut of several billion euros in central government
allocations proposed to the president was postponed until after the 2012 presiden-
tial elections. The second measure was the replacement of the business tax (the rate
of which was set by local authorities) by a new tax on corporate added value
(CVAE) (with a maximum national rate set by Parliament) in order to slow
down the rate of growth in local authority revenues (Le Lidec, 2011).
Increasing tax yields while avoiding the blame: Disguised increases and ‘virtuous taxes’. With
regard to decisions on the revenue side, the strategy was also to use low-proﬁle
instruments (Bezes, 2007) and obfuscation strategies (Lindbom, 2007; Pierson,
1994), mainly through disguised increases in certain taxes and numerous measures
to eliminate and rationalize ﬁscal spending. Due to electoral constraints, the patch-
work of revenue measures was rather inconsistent, running counter to the stated
goal of clarifying and simplifying the French tax system. In response to the Court
of Accounts recommendation for a E10 billion cut in the total cost of ﬁscal expend-
iture, matched by the same amount from corporate tax shelters from 2011 onwards
(Cour des comptes, 2010), the government applied a general cheese-paring strategy
in these areas. The public ﬁnance planning bill for the period 2011–2014 provided
for a minimum yield of E11 billion in 2011, primarily relying on measures to
increase compulsory contributions and on the elimination of ﬁscal spending and
corporate tax shelters. The report appended to the ﬁnance White Paper for 2012
provided for the elimination of E5.2 billion of tax shelters in 2011 followed by a
further reduction of E1.6 billion (Cour des comptes, 2012: 104). In itself, the tech-
nique employed – prioritizing the elimination of tax shelters rather than increasing
tax rates – reﬂects the eﬀorts by the president to remain faithful, if not to the spirit
of his programme, at least to the letter of his electoral undertakings, having pro-
mised in 2007 not to increase tax rates.
Nonetheless, there were two kinds of exception to the faithfulness to the ‘no more
taxes’ rule. Beyond the low-proﬁle measure of de-indexing the tax scale, which
automatically increased contribution rates for taxpayers whose incomes had
grown, another tactic was also employed to minimize the political cost of tax meas-
ures. This consisted in a multiplicity of ‘micro-duties’, taxes characterized by their
indirectness, their low yield and their potentially positive impact on the regulation of
individual behaviour (for instance, the increase in duties on ﬁzzy drinks and beer),
which minimized their electoral cost and the associated social backlash.
Headline tax and matching the fiscal timetable to the electoral cycle. A ﬁnal series of
measures – tax hikes – were introduced during the last month of the mandate,
with the aim of matching the ﬁscal timetable to the electoral cycle in order to rally
the French around a re-burnished image of the president. The ﬁrst headline meas-
ure was the creation of an ‘exceptional tax on very high earnings’, adopted in the
2012 Finance Bill, which ran counter to the measures taken in favour of the well-oﬀ
at the beginning of the presidency. Adopted against the background of the electoral
campaign, the measure was intended to be ‘reparatory’ and to erase the stigma (the
‘president of the rich’) attached to Sarkozy’s initial tax policy (the loi TEPA and
the tax shield). The top income tax rate was increased by one point, capital gains
tax on real estate by three points and tax on capital gains and dividends by one
point. A third type of headline tax hike, the rise in value-added tax (VAT) rates,
was also agreed under the 2012 Finance Bill. The desirability of its adoption had
been debated on numerous occasions, notably, between the two rounds of the 2007
legislative elections, but rejected because of its political costs. Initially conceived as
a revenue-neutral reform, intended to bring about a ‘ﬁscal devaluation’ through the
shift from social contributions to VAT, it was resurrected in the form of a revenue-
raising measure. The rise in the standard rate of VAT from 19.6% to 21.2% and
the two point hike in social contributions on ﬁnancial earnings from 13.5% to
15.5% were expected to generate more than E13 billion in revenue and to oﬀset
an equivalent reduction in the level of employers’ contributions, a measure intro-
duced to stimulate employment.
Ultimately, since the presidential elections were to be held in May 2012, the
introduction of the VAT increase was deferred to 1 October 2012 and the hike in
income-related tax contribution (CSG) to 1 July 2012. The timing of the adoption
of these measures (approved in the ﬁrst Amended Finance Bill for 2012 on 14
March 2012)7 was intended to enable the president to reap the political rewards
from them without immediately having to bear the cost.
The consolidation strategy under multiple influences: The
importance of blame-avoidance strategies
In order to understand the content and design of the consolidation policy con-
ducted in France, we take into account the overlap between economic and admin-
istrative viabilities, international interdependencies, and blame-avoidance
strategies.
The formulation of an economic and budgetary response: Viabilities and
international constraints
Our exploration of the decision-making process at work in retrenchment policy has
shown the importance of the nature of the stimuli and the magnitude of the crisis
signals experienced, perceived and interpreted by the decision-makers in a context
of great interdependencies between the countries.
The pros of being ‘one of the cleanest dirty shirts in the Eurozone’. The characteristics of
France’s economy, with the highest level of public spending as a proportion of
GDP (56%) and the biggest balance-of-trade deﬁcit in the Eurozone, tempered the
impact of the 2008 crisis and did not prompt any drastic questioning of budgetary
policy.
Less dependent on global trade, the dip in GDP was much less marked in France
than in other countries. Whereas some countries were used to running budget
surpluses and suddenly had to deal with substantial deﬁcits, France’s ﬁnances
had been in disrepair before the 2008 crisis. At the heart of the crisis, therefore,
the change appeared less sudden: the overall government deﬁcit increased only
slightly in 2009 and 2010, largely sustained by the operation of the big automatic
stabilizers.
The bail-out plan for the French banks used less public money than in some
other countries since state action was essentially limited to providing a guarantee to
enable the banks to borrow (Cour des comptes, 2013: 155–190). The bail-out plan
even generated additional state revenues from 2009 onwards.
The scale of variation in the economic and budgetary situation was smaller in
France than in many other EU countries. France’s political decision-makers were
even less inclined to dramatize the situation in that they had four further reasons
for continued conﬁdence. First, the international markets remained conﬁdent and
did not seem alarmed by the continuing widening in France’s trade deﬁcit since
2001 and the steady increase in the country’s public debt since the late 1970s.
Second, French debt was characterized by a high degree of liquidity: it was very
easy to buy or sell French government bonds. For this reason, France was con-
sidered as the ‘second-best choice’ in the Eurozone, behind Germany. Third, des-
pite its negative impact on the public ﬁnances and growth, population ageing in
France was less marked than in other countries. With less exposure to future
demographic shock (European Commission, 2012: 35), France’s leaders did not
feel the same degree of urgency about undertaking large-scale consolidation. In
fact, these three factors combined to legitimize the choice of gradual, low-key
eﬀorts without radical structural reform. Last, but not least, France continued to
receive the same AAA rating as Germany until 1 January 2012. The deterioration
in France’s credit began late, on 13 January 2012, with the decision of Standard &
Poor’s agency to withdraw the country’s AAA rating.
However, France also beneﬁted directly from the collapse of the economies of
many Southern European countries. The acuteness of the sovereign debt crisis in its
Southern neighbours led the ﬁnancial markets to look more favourably on France’s
circumstances. In the words of a popular rating agency joke, France continued to
be seen as ‘one of the cleanest dirty shirts in the Eurozone’. The positive attitude of
the rating agencies was probably self-fulﬁlling: while French ratings remained
excellent, French interests rates were held down, which relieved the government
of the need to undertake rapid consolidation. Against a background of sovereign
debt crisis marked by a sharp rise in the perceived risks of the debts of Southern
European countries and by a massive withdrawal of capital from those countries,
France looked like an attractive investment target. The simultaneous and global
nature of the crisis in other countries reduced the cost of the debt burden on the
French state, despite the very fast increase of its debt stocks.
The cons of being ‘one of the cleanest dirty shirts in the Eurozone’. Nonetheless, oﬃcials in
the Finance Ministry and politicians could clearly see that while France was better
oﬀ than the Southern European countries, the comparison with Germany became
negative from 2009. France was hit hard by the sovereign debt crisis in 2011, with a
14% increase in debt-servicing costs (see Table 2), exacerbating the risk of a budget
failure.
Bond yield spreads compared with Germany showed their ﬁrst clear divergence
in 2009 before peaking at 1.5% in mid-2011. As one of the players belonging to the
Treasury Department recalls:
even though in reality it was nothing like as bad as what was happening in Spain or in
Greece, the markets sent a signal with the spread diﬀerential Germany was paying.. . .
For political reasons, France had to remain at the controls with Germany, and
Sarkozy was obsessed with parity with Germany .. . . He wanted France to remain
in the co-pilot’s seat in the management of the crisis.
A budget risk together with the risk of a loss of political credit prompted the
executive to adopt more drastic retrenchment measures than it had previously
implemented. That is why the second planning act for 2011–2014 marked a clear
change in budgetary policy, with the objective of containing public spending
growth at an average of 0.8% over the period (excluding the stimulus package).
The credibility of the classical argument advanced by budget mandarins, stressing
the possibility of a ‘budgetary accident’, received a strong boost with the Greek
crisis and was reinforced in July 2011 by the spread of the sovereign debt crisis to
Italy (France being perceived as the next domino likely to fall after Italy).
The main constraint on France came from Germany’s demands at the time of the
adoption of the European Financial Stability Facility in 2010 and the European
Stability Mechanism in 2012. The solutions devised to tackle the euro crisis rein-
forced the centralization of decision-making power to the European level. When EU
mechanisms were adopted to rescue countries with fast-rising interest rates, the
contributing countries obtained the adoption of rules preventing ‘excessive public
deﬁcits’ and institutional mechanisms designed to prevent further crises. The Fiscal
Compact and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance of 2 March
2012 forced member states to transpose the ‘balanced budget rule’ into their national
legal systems through restrictive provisions. By laying down the principle of budget
balance or surplus in public administrations and by setting a 0.5% ceiling on the
permitted structural deﬁcit (adjusted to take account of economic variations) as the
‘medium-term objective’ that every country had to meet, the European treaties
strengthened controls over the behaviour of national politicians and diminished
their discretionary powers for the future. The solidarity mechanisms came at the
price of increased European central control over national budgetary policies.
However, France only partly played the game, giving the High Council of Public
Finances a narrower remit than that assigned to most of its counterparts (Pisani-
Ferry, 2014: 118). France’s inﬂuence enabled it to manipulate the European rules in
its favour in order to soften the ﬁscal discipline advocated by Germany and to
avoid excessive policy restrictions (for a view on this repeated strategy, see
Howarth, 2007). As Clift (2013: 22) observed:
the structural balance target diﬀers in important respects from the public deﬁcit in the
Maastricht sense in taking more account of the economic cycle and – in theory at
least – allowing for counter-cyclical ﬁscal policy . . .. The way ﬁscal rules are incorpo-
rated into the Fiscal Compact might seem to reﬂect a more ‘French’ than ‘German’
understanding of ﬁscal policy, economic activity and growth . . .. The focus on struc-
tural, as opposed to cyclical components of budget deﬁcits within the new EU and
Table 2. Evolution of the debt service costs in France since 2007 (in millions of euros).
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
2014
(LFI)
2014
(PLFR)
Total debt –
excluding swaps
39,550 44,464 37,625 40,503 46,256 46,303 44,886 46,654 44,854
Trend n+ 1 – +12% –15% +7% +14% 0% –3% +4% 0%
Notes: LFI – Initial Budget Bill; PLFR – Amending Draft Budget Bill.
National frameworks means that how potential growth rates and output gaps are
deﬁned are now of ﬁrst order political signiﬁcance.
According to some economists, these rules led to an underestimation of the output
gap, the scale of the structural deﬁcit and the extent of the public spending cuts
required (Artus, 2013).
Concentration of political power as a two-edged sword in a context of
political polarization
Our description of the decision-making process challenges the usual political
science assumption that unitary states with single-party governments in semi-pre-
sidential regimes are more capable of taking swift and drastic decisions (Elgie and
McMenamin, 2008) and supports explanations in terms of the concentration of
blame. By concentrating power, the Fifth Republic’s institutional model also con-
centrates responsibilities and therefore, paradoxically, encourages a ﬂight from
responsibility when diﬃcult or electorally expensive decisions have to be taken
(Pierson, 1994). From that point of view, our ﬁndings are in line with models
which predict that increasing political polarization increases debt accumulation
(Alesina and Tabellini, 1990; Alt and Lassen, 2006).
The ﬁrst illustration is that political advocacy of retrenchment policies is con-
sidered very costly in the French system. In 2007, when the ﬁve-year term began
with a relaxation of budgetary constraints (Clift, 2012a), Prime Minister Fillon’s
speech, in which he declared that he was in charge of a ‘bankrupt state’, was
disowned by the president. Later, in 2009, far from taking advantage of the
crisis to justify a liberal policy of retrenchment, in keeping with his personal pref-
erences, President Sarkozy instead adopted the role of resolute defender of the
French welfare state model, deliberately playing up the contrast between himself
and leaders of countries forced into austerity measures. This posture as guarantor
of the French welfare model was in tune with opinion polls. President Sarkozy
ﬁrmly believed that he would be punished by the electorate if he decided to imple-
ment a drastic ﬁscal adjustment.
The second illustration is the inﬂuence of the electoral cycle on the ﬁscal time-
table. To a signiﬁcant degree, the electoral time frames were unfavourable to French
government action on both the upstream and downstream sides. On the upstream
side, the crisis hit in 2008 when President Sarkozy had already put together and
launched his main reforms. The result was a signiﬁcant level of policy dependency
that prevented the government modifying its initial formulation, especially as the
initial RGPP included the objective of deﬁcit-cutting. On the downstream side, with
a mandate set to end in May 2012, the electoral timetable gave the executive no
incentive to adopt drastic consolidation measures immediately after the recovery
plan. The importance of the electoral cycle explains why the implementation of
many consolidation measures was postponed until after the 2012 elections.
Whoever was in power after this would be responsible for implementing the most
important consolidation measures. From March 2010 onwards, the apparent inter-
national consensus in favour of the adoption of stimulus measures was clearly
fading, with the emergence of the sovereign debt crisis revealed by Greece’s situ-
ation. The onset of the pre-electoral phase increased the risk of electoral punishment
associated with retrenchment measures, and conversely constituted an incentive to
deferring the budget adjustments until after the election. Caught between the risk of
losing its AAA credit rating – which would demand the adoption of strong revenue
and spending measures – and an electoral timetable that gave it no incentive for
immediate action, the government sought primarily to manage these tensions by
intensifying its use of decrementally applied ‘low-proﬁle’ instruments. The govern-
ment resorted to the well-tried technique of formulating its budget strategy around
growth estimates grounded in deliberately optimistic hypotheses and chronic under-
budgeting for certain lines (OECD, 2011).
Conclusion
What has happened since the elections of May 2012 can be seen as a conﬁrmation
of the diagnosis reached on the diﬃculties of the French executive – whether
headed by a president of the Right or the Left – in achieving sustainable public
ﬁnances. The scale of the ﬁscal consolidation measures adopted after the presiden-
tial elections ﬁrst showed more obviously the extent to which budgetary adjustment
had been deferred during the previous phase. Despite the campaign promises made
by Franc¸ois Hollande, such as the repeal of measures like the VAT increase, the
executive had no choice but to ratify and even reinforce the ﬁscal measures previ-
ously introduced. The eﬀects have been recessionary. Due to the tendency to the
concentration of power speciﬁc to the Fifth Republic, as outlined earlier, the presi-
dent is seen as accountable for this cutback policy and is facing a dip in political
and social support, as well as ever-growing corporatist opposition, linked both to
its ﬁscal policy and to its attempts to liberalize certain economic sectors.
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Notes
1. This policy was extended and reinforced following the crisis, with 150,000 public service
jobs being eliminated between 2008 and 2012 (IGA et al., 2012).
2. The balance of trade, in continuous decline since the creation of the Eurozone because of
a lack of competitiveness in the non-military industrial sectors, turned negative in 2003,
switching directly from +0.6 to –4 billion euros. In 2007, the trade deficit rose to E53
billion, even before the start of the crisis.
3. French public spending grew faster than GDP: over the period 2004–2008, the gap
between France’s and Germany’s public debt-to-GDP ratios was five points.
4. Quoted in Le Figaro, 2 July 2010.
5. French pensions accounted for 13.3%ofGDP in 2009, the highest rate amongOrganisation
for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD) countries, just behind Italy (before
its reforms). The 2010 reform in France provided for a gradual increase in the minimum
pension age from 60 to 62 by 2017, depending on the year of birth, and an increase in the full
pension age from 65 to 67 between 2016 and 2022. The contribution rates of civil servants
would rise gradually from 7.85% to 10.55% by 2020.
6. Health insurance spending in the basic social security systems accounted for 16% of total
public spending in 2010, that is, 9% of GDP.
7. The decree implementing the increase in the VAT rate was published in the Official
Journal the same day as the second round of the presidential election.
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